Pakistan’s “first successful flight test of Surface to Surface
Ballistic Missile Ababeel” has been claimed to be capable of “defeating the
enemy’s hostile radars” and aimed at ensuring survivability of Pakistan’s ballistic missiles in the growing regional
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) environment”. The Press Release by Inter-Services Public Relations
(ISPR) is implicit of Pakistani bloviation to have reinforced nuclear
deterrence vis-à-vis India. In reality, Pakistan is forcing
all, starting from its inception, to assume that anything India can do, Pakistan can do (!!!), even if it has to
“eat grass and leaves, even go hungry”!
As the MIRVing race has begun, the consequent
speculations on stability-instability, first-strike / second-strike or
preemption, use them or lose them, the viability of strategic triad, arms race or strategic restraint, etc.
will be the core questions of the South Asian nuclear discourse for decades to
come. What intriguing is the impetus it would provide for future ‘multiple
interceptor missile’ (MIM) programs? This may not be so lucrative for India
given its vast ‘strategic depth’, unlike Pakistan. In pursuit of addressing its
lack of ‘strategic depth’, and to attain a full circle in it’s proclaimed ‘full
spectrum deterrence’, Pakistan may think for MIM program in future given its “self-avowed focus on survivability, even if India’s
existing BMD capabilities are quite modest.”
For full operationalization of its MIRVed
missile force, Pakistan has to go a long way. To master the technology and
develop the payloads without Chinese hand and technology, Pakistan may have to
eat branches and trunks! To compete or respond to India’s future (hypothetical)
technological pursuits like CMD or A-sat capability, Pakistan will then have to
eat only the remaining roots. If the Cold War MIRV discourse is any guide,
Islamabad did not learn it right – the MIRV may be technologically “sweet
weapon system” but it, “like a hundred other innovations, never upset the Cold War balance”. To deter India in
the real sense, Pakistan needs to attain full-spectrum development and growth,
not diverting its scares resources for military purposes.
Though many argue that MIRV capability with
Pakistan bound to change the strategic threat dynamics in India’s neighborhood,
Pakistan’s technological claims should be taken with a handful of salt.
Firstly, the use of MIRV technology in a
medium or short-range missile is extremely difficult. Therefore it is “difficult to believe that Pakistan has developed a
MIRVed missile with a range of just over 2000km.”
Secondly, as Leo Sartori argues in an article
aptly titled “The Myth of MIRV” (Aug 30, 1969), a MIRVed missile can
carry only smaller individual warheads, and their combined yield is less than
the yield of the single weapon which the same missile could carry; … “decreased
yield is naturally a disadvantage.”
Thirdly, to penetrate anti-missile defended
area, the MIRVed attack strategy has to succeed by firing a larger number of
missiles to ensure at least one of the warheads reaches the target. In this
case, “MIRV acts as a penetration aid” only; but for this purpose, the difficult
strategy of independent targeting is unnecessary.
The task of exhausting an ABM defense can be accomplished by less complex
system like the multiple-warhead missile or Multiple Re-entry Vehicle
(MRV).
Lastly, high accuracy is extremely essential
to master MIRV capability effectively which Pakistan is lacking at this moment.
Pakistan depends largely on Chinese GPS satellite system Beidou. Furthermore,
it would be impossible for Pakistan to neutralize all Indian silos scattered
across its vast geography.
Moreover, Pakistan has achieved the dubious
status of having the fastest growing nuclear weapons inventory. With MIRV
program, it is going to invest heavily in the production of warheads and
fissile materials, which will increase its size of nuclear arsenal even
further. Unless there is still a clandestine procurement channel operating,
obtaining the required nuclear fuel and components will be a challenge when
Pakistan’s own reserves are meager and open sourcing is difficult.
About the Author:
Dr. Sitakanta Mishra is a faculty of
International Relations Department of School of Liberal Studies (SLS), Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University (PDPU), Gujarat. He tweets@sitakanta_m
Source :- Indrastra
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