By Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd)*
The peremptory rejection of the shipborne variant of Tejas light
combat aircraft (LCA) by the Indian Navy (IN) seems to have surprised most
navy-watching analysts. Their confusion has been compounded by the
near-simultaneous issuance of a global request for information (RFI) for
procurement of “57 multirole fighters for its aircraft carriers” by Naval HQ.
One can deduce two compelling reasons for this, seemingly, radical volte face
by the only service which has shown unswerving commitment to indigenisation
(lately labelled ‘Make in India’) for the past six decades.
Firstly, by exercising a foreclosure option, the IN has
administered a well-deserved and stinging rebuke to the Defence Research &
Development Organisation (DRDO) for its lethargic and inept performance that
has again disappointed our military. The second reason arises from the navy’s
desperate hurry to freeze the specifications of its second indigenous aircraft
carrier (dubbed IAC-2). The choice of configuration, size and propulsion of a
carrier has a direct linkage with the type of aircraft that will operate from
it. This constitutes a ‘chicken and egg’ conundrum — should one freeze the
carrier design first or choose the aircraft first? The IN has, obviously
decided the latter.
The IAC-2 will enter service, in the next decade, at a juncture
where a balance-of-power struggle is likely to be under way in this part of the
world — with China and India as the main players. It is only a matter of time before
China’s carrier task-forces, led by the ex-Russian carrier Liaoning and her
successors, follow its nuclear submarines into the Indian Ocean. Since the
Indian response to such intimidation will need to be equally robust, the
decisions relating to the design and capabilities of IAC-2 (and sisters) assume
strategic dimensions. Essentially, there are three options for selection of
aircraft for the IAC-2.
Ø Conventional take-off and landing types like the US F/A-18 Super
Hornet and French Rafale-M that would require a steam catapult for launch and
arrester-wires for recovery. The relatively large ship would need either a
steam or nuclear plant for propulsion.
Ø Types like the Russian Sukhoi-33 and MiG-29K would require only
a ski-jump for take-off and arrester-wires for landing. This would mean a
smaller ship, driven either by gas turbines or diesel engines. The LCA (Navy)
could have been a contender in this category.
Ø The F-35B Lightning II version of the US Joint Strike Fighter,
capable of vectored-thrust, would require only a ski-jump for take-off, but no
arrester wires since it can land vertically. This would result in the simplest
and cheapest ship; a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) carrier.
Once the IN has selected an aircraft, the ship and its operating
and maintenance facilities can be designed around it avoiding some of the
pitfalls encountered on IAC-1.
Reverting to the LCA saga — as far back as the early 1990s, the
navy had initiated a study for examining the feasibility of adapting the LCA to
shipborne use. While confirming feasibility, the study had revealed some major
problem areas, which included lack of engine thrust, requirement of an arrester
hook and stronger undercarriage, and need for cockpit/fuselage re-design before
the LCA could attempt carrier operations. Undaunted, the Navy re-affirmed its
faith in the programme by contributing over Rs 400 crore as well as engineers
and test pilots to the project.
The IAF accepted the Tejas into service, in July 2016, with
considerable reservations because it had not been cleared for full operational
exploitation and fell short of many IAF qualitative requirements. The prototype
of LCA (Navy) had rolled out six years earlier, in July 2010, raising great
hopes in the IN. However, it is obvious that the DRDO failed to address the
problems listed above with any urgency, leading to ultimate rejection of this
ambitious project.
By its failure to deliver on the LCA (Navy), the DRDO has let down
its most steadfast supporter amongst the armed forces — the navy. A little
introspection by those at the helm of this organisation would reveal to them
three reasons for its abysmal performance despite a wealth of talent and a
network of sophisticated laboratories — an exaggerated opinion of their
capabilities; a lack of intellectual honesty in denying obvious failures and an
unwillingness to seek external help when required.
Today, India has the ignominious distinction of being the world’s
biggest importer of military hardware, whereas China counts amongst the world’s
leading arms exporters and its aeronautical establishment has delivered
aircraft ranging from UAVs to 5th generation fighters, helicopters and
transports to the PLA.
While one would be justified in blaming the scientists and
bureaucrats responsible for defence research and production, the root cause of
this colossal failure lies in political indifference and the inability to
provide vision and firm guidance to our massive but under-performing
military-industrial complex.
*Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd) is
a former chief of the Indian Navy. Comments and suggestions on this article can
be sent to editor@spsindia.in
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