The LCA Tejas program has taken a long time to develop an
indigenous fighter for India's armed forces. Though the Indian Air Force has
inducted the plane, it's still to clear FOC (Final Operational Clearance)
stage. The naval variant being developed alongside to operate from Indian Navy
aircraft carriers was taking even longer. Too long for the Navy to wait.
The peremptory rejection of the shipborne variant of the Tejas light combat
aircraft (LCA) by the Indian Navy seems to have surprised most navy-watching
analysts. Their confusion has been compounded by the near-simultaneous issuance
of a global request for information (RFI) for procurement of "57 multirole
fighters for its aircraft carriers" by Naval HQ.
One can deduce two compelling reasons for this, seemingly, radical volte
face by the only service which has shown unswerving commitment to
indigenisation (lately labelled 'Make in India') for the past six decades.
Firstly, by exercising a foreclosure option, the navy has administered a
well-deserved and stinging rebuke to the Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) for its lethargic and inept performance that has again
disappointed our military. The second reason arises from the navy's desperate
hurry to freeze the specifications of its second indigenous aircraft carrier
(IAC-2).
The choice of configuration, size and propulsion of a carrier has a
direct linkage with the type of aircraft that will operate from it. This
constitutes a "chicken and egg" conundrum -- should one freeze the
carrier design first or choose the aircraft first? The Indian Navy has
obviously decided the latter.
The IAC-2 will enter service in the next decade, at a
juncture where a balance-of-power struggle is likely to be underway in this
part of the world -- with China and India as the main players. It is only a
matter of time before China's carrier task-forces, led by the ex-Russian carrier
Liaoning and her successors, follow its nuclear submarines into the Indian
Ocean.
Since the Indian response to such intimidation will need to be equally robust,
the decisions relating to the design and capabilities of IAC-2 (and sisters)
assume strategic dimensions. Essentially, there are three options for selection
of aircraft for the IAC-2.
* Conventional take-off and landing types like the US F/A-18 Super
Hornet and French Rafale-M that would require a steam catapult for launch and
arrester-wires for recovery. The relatively large ship would need either a
steam or nuclear plant for propulsion.
* Types like the Russian Sukhoi-33 and MiG-29K would
require only a ski-jump for take-off and arrester-wires for landing. This would
mean a smaller ship, driven either by gas turbines or diesel engines. The LCA
(Navy) could have been a contender in this category.
* The F-35B Lightning II version of the US Joint Strike Fighter, capable of
vectored-thrust, would require only a ski-jump for take-off, but no arrester
wires since it can land vertically. This would result in the simplest and
cheapest ship; a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) carrier.
Once the navy has selected an aircraft, the
ship and its operating and maintenance facilities can be designed around it,
avoiding some of the pitfalls encountered on IAC-1.
Reverting to the LCA saga -- as far back as
the early 1990s, the navy had initiated a study for examining the feasibility
of adapting the LCA to shipborne use. While confirming feasibility, the study
had revealed some major problem areas, which included lack of engine thrust,
requirement of an arrester hook and stronger undercarriage, and need for
cockpit/fuselage re-design before the LCA could attempt carrier
operations.
Undaunted, the navy re-affirmed its faith in the programme by
contributing over Rs 400 crore as well as engineers and test pilots to the
project.
The IAF accepted the Tejas into service, in July 2016,
with considerable reservations because it had not been cleared for full operational
exploitation and fell short of many qualitative requirements. The prototype LCA
(Navy) had rolled out six years earlier, in July 2010, raising great hopes.
However, it is obvious that the DRDO failed to address the problems listed
above with any urgency, leading to ultimate rejection of this ambitious
project.
By its failure to deliver on the LCA (Navy), the DRDO has let down its most
steadfast supporter amongst the armed forces -- the Indian Navy. A little
introspection by those at the helm of this organisation would reveal to them
three reasons for its abysmal performance despite a wealth of talent and a
network of sophisticated laboratories -- an exaggerated opinion of their
capabilities; a lack of intellectual honesty in denying obvious failures and an
unwillingness to seek external help when required.
Today, India has the ignominious distinction of being the
world's biggest importer of military hardware, whereas China counts amongst the
world's leading arms exporters and its aeronautical establishment has delivered
aircraft ranging from UAVs to 5th generation fighters, helicopters and
transports to the PLA.
While one would be justified in blaming the scientists and bureaucrats
responsible for defence research and production, the root cause of this
colossal failure lies in political indifference and the inability to provide
vision and firm guidance to our massive but under-performing
military-industrial complex.
Source :- India Times
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