The ballistic missile defense (BMD) – a
country’s ability to shoot down an incoming projectile – in Asia is challenging
the deterrence equilibrium not only between India and Pakistan but also with
China.
With Delhi being pivotal in Washington’s long-term policy of containing
domination of Beijing, the calculus of threat-perception has become awfully
complex. Former US President Barack Obama not only anomalously amplified China
as a threat while submitting to Russia’s advances but also authorised
development of space-based weapon systems known as Strategic Defence Initiative
(or Star Wars) in Reagan years. For a layman, Strategic Defence Initiative is
an interplay of a series of satellites and ground-based missiles that were then
meant to shoot down incoming missiles from the Soviet Union and other nations.
The nuclearisation of space aims to undermine the ballistic missile defence.
China, which may surpass America in space research by 2030, will soon follow the
suit. India will react too, prompting Pakistan to consider its options.
Ababeel to ‘neutralise India’s defence shield’
In the eventful month of January, Pakistan laid bare its
submarine-launched cruise missile, Babur III, followed by testing of medium
range ballistic missile Ababeel boasting 2,200-kilometer range. Not only does
the last tested offensive projectile covers much of India but also adds
Islamabad to exclusive club of countries – United States, Russia and China – to
have multiple independently-launched vehicles. After the development and
deployment of Ababeel, Pakistan will be able to launch a space-skimming missile
with multiple nuclear warheads, which can target designated locations,
seriously outdoing India’s missile defences. The joke is on Delhi now!
The fresh arms race scudded by Obama’s White House has already enabled
India to declare extension in range of BrahMos ballistic missile to 600
kilometres, which was not possible without her joining the Missile Technology
Control Regime. Moreover, India has close cooperation in defence sector
especially anti-ballistic missile development. The US ally has been working on
its ‘multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle’ (MIRV) missiles too,
which are likely to be based on Agni V. Until the “pivot of Asia” stirred up
things, China was not considering modernising its nuclear and missile arsenal
as urgently as now seems the case.
UN Security Council rejects India’s anti-Pakistan proposal
For a strategic thinker, the Cold War model has limited significance
considering triangular nature of deterrence. From threat-perception analysis to
doctrinal evaluation, and development of weapon systems to actual deployment,
Pakistan-India-China nuclear balance of power is mind boggling.
As for the existing capabilities, China can attack anywhere in India. A
matching capability rests with Delhi, which obviously covers much smaller
Pakistan too. Islamabad’s Shaheen III leaves India pretty much
vulnerable. China emerges the most advanced when it comes to missile defence
while Pakistan being the least. In a real world, there is a greater probability
of an India-Pakistan war than Sino-India. Notwithstanding efficacy issues of
any missile defence systems, India is better shielded than its western neighbour. Thus, Islamabad’s
development of MIRVs was necessitated to maintain mutual vulnerability or
deterrence.
While it was India, which initiated arms race in the realm of tactical
nuclear weapons by testing one at Pokhran in May 1998, Pakistan has steadfastly
focused in perfecting its short-range Nasr missile meant to deliver low-yield
payload.
Does Pakistan pose a bigger threat to India after Babur-III launch?
The next problem relates to Ababeel and India’s Cold Start doctrine,
which aims to deny Pakistan justification to resort to its nuclear first-use
option by inflicting rapid, fatal and limited attacks. With the MIRVs,
Islamabad will have a choice as to whether to use tactical nuclear weapons on
advancing India columns of tanks and infantry on its own soil or direct the
punitive action behind the enemy lines in a more telling manner, demoralising
the invasive troops.
Nonetheless, Pakistan has merely showcased a strategic option of
delivering multiple warheads; the system requires resources and time to reach
full maturity. Besides the size of the Ababeel arsenal, the released warhead’s
capability to hit the target accurately will need painstaking research and
investment.
India’s response to new developments has been mostly of disbelief and
denial. Given its rampant over-confidence, Delhi is more prone to take chances
in the event of a war. Its larger dilemma is the presence of nuclear extremists
and anarchists at the helm of security establishment led by Narendra Modi. The
aggressive ideologues are already having a difficult time holding back on
declaration of first-use policy. Even if it does not pronounce, deployment
pattern of its nuclear-capable missiles will provide a hint as to where it
stands on declared policy of no-first use vis-Ã -vis Pakistan and China.
China, India and Pakistan need a customised version of Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty that existed between US and the USSR. Though there’s little
room for limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, the vulnerability of failing
to protect the citizens in the event of a nuclear war is mutual. None of the
three countries have the resources as well as priority to secure the population
against nuclear fallout. What to talk of building bunkers, there has been no
minimal training in civil defence in the wake of a conventional war. Though it
is a horrifyingly risky undertaking, yet prospect of annihilation brings forth
a humanitarian deterrent against use of nuclear weapons. Paradoxically, there’s
no active, common confidence-building mechanism amongst the trio.
India’s elusive ‘Cold Start’ doctrine and Pakistan’s military preparedness
The Indian side often mocks Pakistan’s position of maintaining minimum
credible deterrence. The strategic analysts there tend to ignore that
Pakistan’s aim of credible minimum deterrence does not exist in isolation. If India keeps on importing
fissile material and foreign expertise besides displaying more sophisticated
delivery systems, the threshold of credible minimum deterrence will either
increase or bluntly put be trashed. To clear another misconception, the MIRVs
are meant to replenish and upgrade Pakistan’s deference capability and not
upset it out-rightly which is neither intended nor realistic.
Naveed Ahmad is a Pakistani investigative
journalist and academic with extensive reporting experience in the Middle East
and North Africa. He is based in Doha and Istanbul and tweets @naveed360
Source :- The Express Tribune
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